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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the performance of founder-controlled firms vis-à-vis firms controlled by 
founders’ descendants and relatives among Taiwanese publicly traded firms.  After adjusting for 
size, age, growth potential, financial leverage, and industry effects, we find that the Taiwanese 
descendant-controlled firms underperform the matching founder-controlled firms.  In searching 
for the potential reasons, we find that the average board size for the descendant-controlled firms 
is significantly larger than that of the founder-controlled firms.  In addition, the ratios of family-
related supervisors and board members of the descendant-controlled firms are significantly higher 
than those of the matching founder-controlled firms.  While the significantly larger board size 
suggests a potential power struggle between the controlling family and the non-family related 
board members, the stronger family domination in the board of directors and supervisors for the 
descendant-controlled firms provides room for entrenchment and tunneling.  In light of the 
absence of large outside blockholders and relatively weaker legal protections, the minority 
shareholders of Taiwanese firms are dependent upon internal monitoring mechanisms to protect 
them from the expropriation of the controlling families.  However, our results indicate that family 
control has undermined the internal monitoring mechanism of the Taiwanese descendant-
controlled firms. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
his study investigates the performance of founder-controlled firms vis-à-vis firms controlled by 
founders’ descendants and relatives among Taiwanese publicly traded firms.  Since Berle and Means 
first established the agency theory of the modern corporation in 1932, the whole stream of agency 
theory literature focuses on the agency problems created by the separation of ownership and the control of resources 
acquired by ownership.  After Jensen and Meckling (1976) published their ownership theory, most of the researchers 
investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance with a focus on U.S. firms.  It is 
La Port, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) who provide the first broad investigation on equity ownership across 
countries.  The authors contend that family control of publicly traded firms is the norm of the non-U.S. world.  
However, the existing literature provides little evidence on the characteristics of the controlling families and how 
these controlling families affect firm performance. 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Denis and Denis (1994) are the few 
studies that examine family control of publicly-listed U.S. firms.  They do not find evidence of expropriation of 
minority shareholders' wealth by the controlling families.  However, since their sample firms are all majority-owned 
by the controlling families, they cannot disentangle the family-control effects from the ownership effects.  Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra (1998), and McConaughy and Phillips 
(1999) are among a few studies that examine the relationship between founder control and firm characteristics of the 
U.S. publicly traded firms.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, examine the founder effect on firm performance.  They 
____________________ 
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report that the presence of the founding family as the two top officers -- the chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
president -- reduces firm value for firms incorporated before 1950, but increases firm value for those incorporated in 
1950 or later.  The authors suggest that the descendents are too entrenched at the older firms, making it difficult to 
remove them, as one potential explanation for the contrast.  McConaughy and Phillips investigate the characteristics 
of the founder-controlled versus the descendant-controlled firms.  However, they find that their sample of 
descendant-controlled firms is more profitable than their sample of founder-controlled firms. 
 
In light of the mixed results documented for the U.S. firms, our study provides new evidence on the 
characteristics of founder-controlled and descendant-controlled firms using firms in the Taiwanese market.  We 
select the Taiwanese market for our study because of the following desirable characteristics.  First, as one of the 
“Far East Asia Tigers”, Taiwan is ranked the 13th largest economy in the world with more than 90% of its GDP 
generated by family-controlled firms.  The majority of the Taiwanese listed firms are run and controlled by the 
founding family even though the family may not be the majority owner.  This unique feature allows us to 
disentangle the family-control effects from the ownership effects.  Second, rooted as it is in the German civil law 
system, the Taiwanese board structure is a hybrid between the U.S. and the U.K. unitary board structure and the 
German two-tier board structure.  However, unlike the German system, which puts into place an independent 
supervisory board to supervise the managerial board, the Taiwanese system institutes individual shareholders as 
supervisors to monitor the CEO and the board of directors.  The functions of the Taiwanese board of directors are 
similar to that of the U.S. inside board members, while the functions of the Taiwanese supervisors are similar to that 
of the U.S. outside board members.  A third distinct feature is the ownership structure.  Unlike the U.S. and the U.K. 
where institutional investors own more than 60% of the equity ownership, the average equity holdings in the 
Taiwanese firms by institutional investors is well below 10%.  Therefore, the incentive for the Taiwanese 
institutional investors to monitor the incumbent is much lower than that of the U.S. and the U.K. institutional 
investors.  This lack of external monitoring leaves the minority shareholders dependent upon the internal monitoring 
mechanism -- supervisors -- to protect them from expropriation by the controlling family. 
 
Our sample includes 30 Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms and 30 matching founder-controlled firms. 
Our study period covers from 1990 to 1997.  As in other newly developing markets, the Taiwanese firms are 
relatively young compared to their counterparts in more advanced markets.  Our Taiwanese descendant-controlled 
firms tend to be older and larger than the founder-controlled firms in the same industry.  After adjusting for size, 
age, growth potential, financial leverage, and industry effects, we find that the Taiwanese descendant-controlled 
firms underperform the matching founder-controlled firms.  Our results are consistent with those reported by Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny. (1988), but differ from those reported by McConaughy and Phillips (1999).  In searching for 
the potential explanation of why the Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms under perform their counterpart of 
founder-controlled firms, we find that the average board size for the descendant-controlled firms is significantly 
larger than that of the founder-controlled firms.  In addition, the ratios of family-related supervisors and board 
members of the descendant-controlled firms are significantly higher than those of the matching founder-controlled 
firms.  These findings are consistent with the conjecture by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny that the descendants are too 
entrenched and, therefore, cannot to be removed by shareholders.  Therefore, we conclude that family control has 
undermined the internal monitoring mechanisms of our sample of descendent-controlled firms. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a review of related literature.  
Section three contains data description and univariate test results.  Section four discusses the results from 
multivariate analysis. The final section concludes this study. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Since Berle and Means first established the agency theory of the modern corporations in 1932, the whole 
stream of agency theory literature focuses on the agency problems created by the separation of ownership and the 
control of resources acquired by ownership.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when the owner-manager sells 
off a proportion of his ownership or borrows a lump-sum from the money market, there exists an incentive for him 
to favor his personal interest at the expenses of other stakeholders.  Fama and Jensen (1983) analyze agency 
problems on the basis of residual claims.  They propose that the owners of an organization are the ones bearing the 
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residual risk – the risk of difference between the inflows of resources and outflows of promised payments.  The 
organizational form that separates management from control leads to less restrictive residual-risk bearing, and thus a 
more diffused ownership structure.  Demsetz (1983) examines agency problems based on potential on-the-job-
consumption by managers.  He contends that there are two sources of on-the-job consumption: the known individual 
consumption that reflects the personal preference of the owner-manager, and the unknown individual consumption – 
shirking, which reflects the monitoring costs borne by the company.  The diffusion of ownership for a business 
organization involves trade-offs between on-the-job consumption by the managers and the monitoring costs borne 
by the company. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Demsetz (1983) suggest an intertwined 
relationship between corporate ownership and agency costs.  Built on these fundamental blocks, most researchers 
have focused on U.S. firms in investigations of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) first examine the determinants of corporate ownership concentration and 
the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance.  However, they do not find a significant relationship 
between ownership concentration and the accounting performance of their sample of firms.  Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) provide evidence that contrasts to Demsetz and Lehn.  With piece-wise regression, they find a non-
linear relationship between board ownership and Tobin’s Q.  Their results show that in the low range of board 
ownership, Tobin’s Q increases when board ownership increases.  After the board ownership reaches five percent of 
the total outstanding shares, Tobin’s Q decreases as board ownership increases.  McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
report a similar relationship between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership -- shares owned by board members plus 
managers. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) provide the first broad investigation of the equity owner-
ship across countries.  The authors examine ownership structure of the publicly listed firms of 47 wealth countries 
and report that the majority of their sample firms are run and held by controlling families. They point out that family 
control of publicly traded firms is the norm in the non-U.S. world.  However, the existing literature provides little 
evidence on the characteristic of the controlling families and how these controlling families affect firm performance.  
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Denis and Denis (1994) are the few studies 
that examine family control of publicly listed U.S. firms.  They do not find evidence of expropriation of minority 
shareholders' wealth by the controlling families.  However, since their sample firms are all majority-owned by the 
controlling families, they cannot disentangle the family-control effects from the ownership effects. 
 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra (1998) and McCo-
naughy and Phillips (1999) are among a few studies that examine the relationship between founder control and firm 
characteristics of publicly listed U.S. firms.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, examine the founder effect on firm 
performance.  They report that the presence of the founding family as the two top officers -- the CEO and the 
president -- reduces firm value for firms incorporated before 1950, but increases firm value for those incorporated in 
1950 or later.  The authors conjecture that "in young firms founders play an important entrepreneurial role, whereas 
in older firms they or especially their descendants thwart value maximization and are too entrenched to be removed 
(page 311)."  McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra investigate the efficiency of the U.S. founding family 
controlled firms (FFCFs), “firms whose CEO are either the founder or a descendant of the founder (page one)”.  
Using three-year average data (1986-1988) of 73 pairs of FFCFs and non-FFCFs, they show that FFCFs are more 
efficient than the matching non-FFCFs.  They also find that younger FFCFs are more efficient than older ones.  
McConaughy and Phillips compare the profitability and efficiency of 90 founder-controlled U.S. firms vis-à-vis 57 
U.S. firms controlled by descendents or relatives of the founders, i.e., firms whose CEO are either a descendant or a 
relative of the founder.  Their results show that founder-controlled firms grow faster and invest more heavily in 
research and development; however, descendant-controlled firms are more profitable. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) investigate the influences of different legal 
systems on corporate governance structure.  They contend that the legal and institutional framework has a direct 
influence on minority shareholder protections.  According to the origin of a country’s legal system, the authors 
categorize the 49 countries in their study into four groups: the English-origin, the French-origin, the German-origin, 
and the Scandinavian-origin.  Their study shows that countries in the English common law system score the highest 
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in minority shareholder protections, while countries in the French civil law system score the lowest.  The Taiwanese 
system, which has its origin in German civil law, is categorized as relatively weaker in minority shareholder 
protections than the U.S. and the U.K. systems, both based on English common law.  The authors argue that diffused 
equity ownership is less likely to arise in countries with weak legal protections for minority shareholders.  They 
propose that in markets with relatively weaker legal protections, insider ownership substitutes for external 
monitoring. In light of the mixed results documented for the U.S. firms, this study provides new evidence on the 
characteristics of founder-controlled and descendant-controlled firms in a market dominated by family-controlled 
firms but with relatively weaker minority shareholder protections. 
 
III. Data Description and Univariate Analysis 
 
Our main data source is the data bank constructed by Taiwan Economic Journal Co., Ltd. (TEJ).  Founded 
in 1990, TEJ is the largest commercial vender of capital-market data in Taiwan.  It also contributes to many other 
databases, which include Datastream International, Ltd., Worldscope, QUICK, BARRA, and Capital Interactive 
Prospective.  TEJ constructs its database based on the information published in (1) the Taiwan Securities and 
Exchange Commission Statistics Year Book, (2) the prospectus and quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports filed 
with the TSEC by all listed companies, and (3) articles and announcements published in the local newspapers. 
 
The study covers a period of eight years from 1990 through 1997.  The Asian crisis started in August 1997, 
and eventually hit the Taiwanese market in early 1998.  To avoid potential problems related to the crisis, we use data 
up to 1997.  To ensure that we have at least four years of financial data for each firm, we require sample firms to be 
listed before the end of 1994.  As in other newly developing markets, the Taiwanese firms are relatively young.  The 
average listing age of the whole sample is 10.6 years; therefore, most of the listed firms are still under the control of 
the founders.  Of the 299 firms listed by the end of 1994, only thirty-six firms are descendant-controlled.  Following 
McConaughy and Phillips (1999), we identify the matching founder-controlled firms by screening firms in the same 
industry with average sales falling in the range of plus or minus 25%.  We find that most of the Taiwanese 
descendant-controlled firms are older and larger than their industry counterparts.  We cannot identify a proper 
matching firm for six firms because they are among the largest in their industries.  Our final sample includes 30 
pairs of descendant-controlled firms and their matching counterparts.  Table 1 provides the distribution of the 
sample firms in different industries and the number of firm-years of data included in our study. 
 
IV. Fixed-effect Panel Analysis 
 
The evidence from our univariate analysis suggest that the sample descendant-controlled firms are statisti-
cally no different from the matching founder-controlled firms in size (measured by sales and total assets), growth 
potential (measured by R&D expenditures per 1,000 dollars of assets) and financial leverage (measured by debt to 
total assets ratio).  Prior studies indicate that these variables are major determinants of firm performance
1
.  To assess 
the incremental effects of the descendant-controlled firms vis-à-vis the founder-controlled firms, it is crucial to 
include these variables in multivariate analysis.  We run multivariate regressions using different performance 
measures as the dependent variable.  The independent variables include a dummy variable, SND, which equals one 
if a firm is descendant-controlled and zero otherwise.  In addition, we include the logarithm of total assets, the ratio 
of the R&D expenditures to total assets, the ratio of total debt to total assets, and the number of years since the 
company was founded as control variables.  By including these factors as independent variables we estimate the 
marginal explanatory power of the SND dummy variable on firm performance measures.  Excluding these variables 
could bias the estimates for the SND dummy variable.  In addition, we also investigate if industry effect was a 
critical factor in determining performance.  To explore the industry effect, we estimate two sets of regressions, one 
using data adjusted for industry-level effects and the other with the raw data.  To make the adjustment we subtract 
the industry-average of each variable from the data for each firm to obtain the industry-adjusted value of all the 
variables. 
 
 
Table 1 
                                                 
1 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
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Distribution of sample firms and firm-year observations by industry 
 
This table reports our sample descendant-controlled firms, the matching founder-controlled firms and the firm-year observations 
in our study. Of the 299 publicly listed firms by the end of 1994, thirty-six are descendant-controlled.  We identify the matching 
founder-controlled firms by screening firms in the same industry with average sales falling in the range of plus or minus 25%.  
We exclude six of the descendant-controlled firms because they are among the largest in their industries, and we cannot find a 
matching counter part.  Our final sample contains 60 firms and 434 firm-year observations across our study period, 1990-1997*. 
 
Industry 
Number of firms listed by 
the end of 1994 
Number of descendent-
controlled firms in  
our study 
Number of firm-years 
observation for both sample 
and matching firms 
Cement 9 3 45 
Food 25 3 46 
Plastic  17 0 0 
Textile 45 4 64 
Electric Machinery 12 3 39 
Electric Appliance & Wire 11 1 16 
Chemical 16 2 29 
Glass & Porcelain 6 1 14 
Paper & Pulp 7 0 0 
Steel 18 1 15 
Rubber 8 2 26 
Auto 4 0 0 
Electronic 32 3 37 
Construction 22 3 42 
Transportation 11 1 14 
Tourist (Hotel) 6 1 16 
Banks & Insurance Co. 22 0 0 
Department Stores 7 1 16 
Conglomerate Enterprise 1 0 0 
Others 20 1 14 
Total 299 30* 434 
* The final sample contains 30 descendant-controlled firms and their counter part of founder-controlled firms. 
 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and the univariate analysis of the sample and matching firms.  The 
financial data in Panel A show that the Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms and founder-controlled firms are of 
similar size (measured both in average sales and average total assets.)  Annual sales average NT$6,805 million 
(US$206 million) for descendant-controlled firms and NT$6,440 million (US$195 million) for the matching 
founder-controlled firms
2
.  The mean total assets of our sample is NT$11,990 million (US$363 million) and 
NT$11,090million (US$336 million) for the matching firms.  Total debt to total assets ratio averages 0.38 for the 
sample firms and is similar to 0.37 for the matching firms.  On average, the descendant-controlled firms spend 
US$7.2 on R&D for every US$1,000 assets, while the matching founder-controlled firms spend US$7.0 on R&D for 
every US$1,000 assets.  Results of the univariate analysis suggest that the financial  data  of  the  matching  founder-
controlled firms are not significantly different from that of our sample descendant-controlled firms. 
Panel B reports the performance data.  We employ seven different performance measures: market-to-book 
                                                 
2
 The value of the New Taiwan dollar (NT$) is determined under a managed float exchange rate regime.  During the study period, the value of 
one U.S. dollar fluctuated in the range of NT$30 to NT$35.  Because of the relatively narrow range, we felt comfortable in using the average 
exchange rate of NT$33 per US$, over the period, to convert the NT$ amounts into US$. 
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ratio (Tobin’s Q), net profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity, return on assets, total assets turnover 
ratio, and operating income to total assets ratio.  The univariate analysis shows that the descendant-controlled firms 
underperform their counterpart of founder-controlled firms in five performance measures.  The two performance 
measures that are statistically indifferent between the two groups include: the mean net profit margin (0.07 for the 
descendant-controlled firm, and 0.08 for the founder-controlled firms), and the average total assets turnover ratio 
(0.64 for the sample descendant-controlled firms and 0.68 for the matching founder-controlled firms.) 
 
 
Table 2 
Comparative Statistics of Firm Characteristics and Performance Variables 
 
Reported are the mean of the financial and performance data for the sample descendant-controlled firms and matching founder-
controlled firms.  Panel A shows the average annual sales, book value of total assets, debt ratio and R&D expenditures.  Panel B 
reports the performance data.  N is the number of firm-years of data for each group of firms.  T-test statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel A. Financial Data 
Descendant-
controlled Firms 
Founder-controlled 
Firms 
Difference 
Number of firm-years of data 215 219  
    
Sales (US$ million) 206 195 9 
   (0.69) 
    
Book value of total assets (US$ million) 363 336 27 
   (1.08) 
    
Debt ratio 0.38 0.37 0.01 
   (0.22) 
    
R&D expenditures per thousand dollar of assets 7.2 7.0 0.02 
    (0.08) 
Panel B. Performance Data    
Market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q) 1.9 2.1 -0.2*** 
   (-3.18) 
    
Net profit margin 0.07 0.08 -0.01 
   (-0.58) 
    
Operating profit margin 0.07 0.09 -0.02*** 
   (-2.54) 
    
Return on total assets 0.04 0.05 -0.01*** 
   (-2.55) 
    
Return on equity 0.06 0.08 -0.02*** 
   (-2.38) 
    
Operating profit to total assets ratio 0.04 0.05 -0.01*** 
   (-3.30) 
    
Total assets turnover ratio 0.64 0.68 -0.04 
   (-1.19) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
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OLS Regressions and Industry-level Fixed-effect Analysis 
 
This table presents the results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions and industry-level fixed effects analysis of 
performance measures: market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q), net profit margin, operating profit margin, return on equity, return on 
total assets, total assets turnover ratio, and operating profit to total assets ratio on SND – dummy variable for descendant-
controlled firms and control variables.  SND equals one if descendant-controlled, and zero if otherwise.  Regression 1 uses the 
raw data, while Regression 2 uses data adjusted for industry-level effects. Industry-adjusted values are obtained by subtracting 
the industry average from the raw data for all variables.  Both regressions are run on the pooled sample.  N is the number of firm-
year observations in the regressions.  Previous studies indicate that the logarithm of total assets, the R&D expenditures per 1,000 
dollar of total assets, and the ratio of total debt to total assets are important determinants of firm performance.  To assess the 
marginal contribution of SND in explaining firm performance, we also include those variables in the regressions.  In addition, 
intercept terms and year dummies are included for all regressions, but not reported.  T-statistics of the coefficients are in 
parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables: 
Performance measures 
Regression 1 
N = 434 
Regression 2 
N = 434 
Market-to-book ratio (Tobin’s Q) 
-0.15*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.18*** 
(-3.65) 
Adj-R2 0.30 0.26 
Net profit margin 
-.02 
(-1.14) 
-0.02 
(-1.50) 
Adj-R2 0.10 0.08 
Operating profit margin 
-0.03*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.03*** 
(-4.60) 
Adj-R2 0.16 0.16 
Return on equity 
-0.03*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.03*** 
(-4.30) 
Adj-R2 0.12 0.16 
Return on total assets 
-0.02*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.53) 
Adj-R2 0.21 0.24 
Total assets turnover ratio 
-0.03 
(-0.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.94) 
Adj-R2 0.20 0.08 
Operating profit to total assets ratio 
-0.02*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.14) 
Adj-R2 0.17 0.21 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results from the multivariate analysis.  Regression 1 shows the results the raw data, 
while Regression 2 uses the data that is adjusted for industry-level effects.  In the presence of size, growth potential 
and financial leverage variables, the coefficient estimate for the SND dummy variable is highly significant and 
negative for five of the firm performance measures.  These results are consistent with those from the univariate 
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analysis.  The sign and the magnitude of the coefficients estimated from the raw data and the industry-adjusted 
values are quite similar.  These results suggest that the Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms underperform their 
matching founder-controlled firms.  Our findings are consistent with those reported by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988), who conjecture that while the founders of their sample of younger U.S. firms (incorporated in 1950 or later) 
contribute entrepreneurship, the founders' descendants are too entrenched to be removed.  To determine the reason 
why Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms underperform their counterparts we investigate whether the descendants 
are entrenched. 
 
To understand why the descendant-controlled firms under perform founder-controlled firms, we examine 
the corporate governance structure as well as other internal mechanisms.  According to La Port, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the Taiwanese corporate governance system has its origin in German-civil-law, which 
provides relatively weaker legal protections than the U.S. English-common-law system.  They further argued that 
insider ownership substitutes for external monitoring in markets with relatively weaker minority shareholder 
protection.  The question, therefore, arise as whether higher insider ownership enhance firm performance for the 
Taiwanese firms?  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) document a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm size.  Given that the average size of our sample of descendant-controlled firms is not significantly different 
from the matching sample of founder-controlled firms, we should expect insider ownership to be similar for both 
groups.  The mean insider ownership for the descendant-controlled firms is 28 percent and 30 percent for the 
matching founder-controlled firms; with a t-statistic is 1.24, there is no difference in the level of insider ownership 
between the two groups of firms.  Nevertheless, in light of the argument advanced by La Port, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), we re-estimate the relationship between the performance measures and SND, and 
include insider ownership in the regressions to ensure that the coefficient estimates of SND are not biased by any 
relationship between insider ownership and the SND variable.  The results from these regressions are reported in 
Table 4.  While the coefficient estimate for insider ownership stays significant and positive across all performance 
measures, the coefficient estimate for SND stays similar to those reported in Table 3.  This finding suggests that 
insider ownership is not the reason why the descendant-controlled firms underperform the founder-controlled firms.  
Our focus now shifts to the board characteristics as potential monitoring mechanisms. 
 
 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis of Firm Performance with Equity Ownership Included in Models 
 
This table presents regression results of the performance measures: market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q), net profit margin, operating 
profit margin, return on equity, return on total assets, total assets turnover ratio, and operating profit to total assets ratio on SND 
dummy variable and insider ownership.  SND equals one if descendant-controlled, and zero otherwise.  Insider ownership is the 
equity ownership of directors, supervisors, and managers, including the holdings by their spouses and minor children.  Previous 
studies indicate that the logarithm of total assets, the R&D expenditures per 1,000 dollar of total assets, and the ratio of total debt 
to total assets are important determinants of firm performance.  To assess the marginal contribution of SND in explaining firm 
performance, we also include these variables in the regressions.  In addition, intercept terms and year dummies are included for 
all regressions, but the estimates are not reported.  N is the number of firm-years of data used in the regressions.  T-statistics of 
the coefficients are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables: 
Industry-adjusted 
Performance Measures 
 
Tobin's Q 
N = 434 
 
NPM 
N = 434 
 
OPM 
N = 434 
 
ROE 
N = 434 
 
ROA 
N = 434 
 
TAT 
N = 434 
 
OPTA 
N = 434 
SND Dummy Variable 
-0.17*** 
(-3.24) 
-.02 
(-1.36) 
-0.03*** 
(-4.46) 
-0.03*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.2 
(-0.98) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.01) 
 
Insider ownership 
0.34* 
(1.92) 
0.11** 
(2.33) 
0.09*** 
(3.95) 
0.07*** 
(2.68) 
0.04*** 
(2.68) 
-0.05 
(-0.66) 
0.03*** 
(2.68) 
Adj-R2 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.08 0.22 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) advance the hypothesis that the dominant equity ownership of U.S. firms by 
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institutional investors provides a strong incentive for the institutional shareholders to monitor the CEO.  McConnell 
and Servaes (1990) report a positive relationship between firm performance and equity ownership of institutional 
investors for their sample of U.S. firms.  In support of the role of institutional investors as active shareholders to 
enhance managerial accountability Cheffins (1999) cite U.K. corporate governance reform during the 1990s as 
reflected in the Combined Code of the U.K.  We examine equity ownership of institutional shareholders for the two 
groups.  The institutional equity holdings average around 0.06 percent for both groups and are statistically the same.  
Therefore, the absence of outside blockholders leaves the minority shareholders of our sample of Taiwanese firms 
dependent upon internal monitoring mechanisms to protect them from exploitation by the controlling families. 
 
In their survey of the U.S. economic literature on the board of directors as a determinant of firm perfor-
mance, Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) report that board size is negatively related to firm performance.  In addition, 
their survey suggests that board composition and size are important factors in the board's decisions regarding CEO 
turnover, acquisitions, adoption of poison pills and CEO compensation.  The Taiwanese board structure is a hybrid 
between the U.S. and the U.K. model of a unitary board and the German two-tier structure.  The Taiwanese board of 
directors is the equivalent of the German managerial board and the Taiwanese supervisors are the designated 
monitors of the CEO and the board of directors.  The role of the Taiwanese board of directors is similar to that 
ascribed to U.S. inside board members, while the role of the Taiwanese supervisors is similar to that associated with 
U.S. outside board members.  If family control undermines the designated functions of the supervisors and/or the 
board of directors, firm performance should suffer.  We test this hypothesis by screening the relationship between 
the board of directors and the CEO, and the relationship between the supervisors and the CEO. Members of the 
board of directors and supervisors are categorized as family-related if: (1) they have blood or marriage ties with the 
CEO, or (2) they are employed by other affiliated companies that are majority-owned by the CEO’s family.  We use 
the last names of directors and supervisors to identify blood and marriage ties to the CEO. 
 
We also use the organizational charts and family trees in the Business Groups in Taiwan published by 
China Credit Information Service, Ltd., to confirm the relationship among corporate insiders.
3
 
 
Table 5 provides comparisons of the board characteristics of our sample of Taiwanese firms.  The size of 
the boards of descendant-controlled firms averages 12.7 directors, and is significantly larger than the average board 
size of 9.7 directors for the founder-controlled firms.  On average, the descendant-controlled firms have 3 
supervisors, which is significantly larger than the average of 2.4 supervisors for the founder-controlled firms.  We 
also find that the descendant-controlled firms have significantly higher family representation on the board of 
directors and supervisors.  Jensen (1993) contends that a large board size makes effective communication among 
board members more difficult, which in turn hinders firm performance.  Yermack (1996) provides empirical 
evidence of an optimal board size of around nine directors for his sample of U.S. firms.  The significantly larger 
board size combined with the stronger family domination of the board of directors and supervisors for the 
descendant-controlled firms suggest a potential power struggle between the controlling family and the non-family 
related board members and supervisors of the descendant-controlled firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
                                                 
3 The main contribution of this data source is that it provides detailed information on the management teams of all the affiliations controlled by 
the controlling family.  According to TEJ, these managers constitute conveniently a pool of figureheads for members of the controlling family.  
This allows us to verify the true independence of the board of directors and supervisors who do not carry the same last names (surnames).  Based 
on this additional information, we consider the board of directors and supervisors who do not have the same last names but are listed in the 
management teams as family-related. 
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Comparison of the Board Characteristics of Sample Firms 
 
We report the characteristics of the board of directors and supervisors for a sample of descendant-controlled firms and matching 
founder-controlled Taiwanese firms. The Taiwanese supervisors are the designated monitors of the CEO and the board of 
directors.  The role of the Taiwanese board of directors is similar to that ascribed to U.S. inside board members, while the role of 
the Taiwanese supervisors is similar to that expected of U.S. outside board members.  Members of the board of directors and 
supervisors are categorized as family-related if: (1) they have blood or marriage ties with the CEO, or (2) they are employed by 
other affiliated firms, which are majority-owned by the CEO’s family. 
 
Composition of the Board of Directors 
and Supervisors 
Descendant-
controlled Firms 
Founder-controlled 
Firms 
Difference 
Number of firm-years of data 215 219  
    
Board size 12.7 9.7 2.9*** 
   (5.02) 
    
Average number of supervisors 3.0 2.4 0.6*** 
    (-3.84) 
    
Family-related board of directors 8.1 5.0 3.1*** 
   (5.13) 
    
The ratio of family-related board members to total 0.70 0.56 0.14*** 
   (5.98) 
    
Family-related supervisors 2.2 1.2 1.0*** 
   (7.65) 
    
The ratio of family-related supervisors to total 0.72 0.57 0.15*** 
   (4.39) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
To assess the incremental explanatory power of SND after controlling for the effects of the characteristics 
of the board and supervisors, we include two additional variables to the multivariate analysis.  The two variables are 
the ratio of family-related board of directors to total board members and the ratio of family-related supervisors to 
total supervisors.  Again, we run multivariate regressions on both the industry-adjusted values and the raw data.  
Since the results for net profit margin and total assets turnover ratio are still insignificant we do not report those 
results.  Also, the results for the industry-adjusted and the raw data are similar; thus we report only those obtained 
with industry-adjusted values in Table 6.  Contrary to our expectation, the results in Table 6 show that the 
coefficient estimates for SND stay negative and highly significant, while the board and supervisor composition 
variables are insignificant across all performance measures. These results indicate that the board and supervisor 
composition variables do not have incremental explanatory power or in any way interfere with the influence of 
descendant control on firm performance.  Together, our findings suggest that family domination of the board of 
directors and supervisors for Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms has undermined the designated functions of the 
internal monitoring mechanism and hindered firm performance.  Johnson, Pa Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2000) investigate the effects of tunneling on firm performance.  They point out that tunneling can take place in 
many different forms.  Their investigation focuses on the "legal" tunneling that happens in developed civil law 
countries.  Our finding for the Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms provides empirical evidence of entrenchment.  
With a dominant number of family-related members serving as board members and supervisors, the CEO of the 
descendant-controlled firms can transfer wealth from the company to his or her own family.  This transfer may 
include the assets or profits of firms, or it may be in the form of hiring unqualified family members. 
 
Table 6 
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Regression Analysis of Firm Performance with Equity Ownership 
and Board Structure Variables Included in Models 
 
This table presents the results of industry-level fixed regressions of performance measures: market-to-book ratio (Tobin's Q), 
operating profit margin, return on equity, return on total assets, and operating profit to total assets ratio on SND dummy variable, 
insider ownership and board structure.  SND equals one if descendant-controlled, and zero otherwise.  Insider ownership is the 
equity ownership of directors, supervisors, and managers, including the holdings by their spouses and minor children.  Previous 
studies indicate that the logarithm of total assets, the R&D expenditures per 1,000 dollar of total assets, and the ratio of total debt 
to total assets are important determinants of firm performance.  To assess the marginal contribution of SND in explaining firm 
performance, we also include these variables in the regressions.  In addition, intercept terms and year dummies are included for 
all regressions, but the estimated coefficients not reported.  N is the number of firm-years of data used in the regressions.  T-
statistics for the corresponding coefficient estimates are in parentheses. 
 
Dependent Variables: 
Industry-adjusted Performance 
Measures 
 
Tobin's Q 
N = 434 
 
OPM 
N = 434 
 
ROE 
N = 434 
 
ROA 
N = 434 
 
OPTA 
N = 434 
Ratio of family-related board of 
directors to all directors 
0.05 
(0.32) 
0.02 
(0.99) 
0.03 
(1.41) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
Ratio of family-related supervisors 
to all supervisors 
-0.04 
(-0.43) 
0.02 
(1.49) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.00 
(-0.63) 
-0.00 
(-0.31) 
SND Dummy Variable 
-0.17*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.03*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.47) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.91) 
Insider ownership 
0.35** 
(1.97) 
0.08*** 
(3.39) 
0.06** 
(2.28) 
0.03** 
(2.29) 
0.03** 
(2.27) 
Adj-R2 0.26 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.22 
*** Significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.10 level. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the performance difference between Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms and 
founder-controlled firms and expands to the existing literature by providing new evidence that enhances our 
understanding of how family control affects the performance of publicly traded firms.  After adjusting for size, age, 
growth potential, financial leverage, and industry effects, we find that Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms 
underperform a matching sample of founder-controlled firms.  Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), report similar 
results for their sample of U.S. firms, and conjecture that the descendants are entrenched and therefore cannot be 
removed.  Our investigation of entrenchment hypothesis reveals that the average board size for the descendant-
controlled firms is significantly larger than that of the founder-controlled firms.  In addition, the ratios of family-
related supervisors and board members of the descendant-controlled firms are significantly higher than that of the 
matching founder-controlled firms.  While the significantly larger board size suggests a potential power struggle 
between the controlling family and the non-family related board members, the stronger family domination on the 
board of directors and supervisors for the descendant-controlled firms provides room for entrenchment.  In light of 
the absence of large outside blockholders and relatively weaker legal protections, the minority shareholders in the 
Taiwan market are dependent on internal monitoring mechanisms to protect them from the exploitation by the 
controlling families.  However, our results indicate that family control has undermined the internal monitoring 
mechanism of the Taiwanese descendant-controlled firms.      
 
 
References 
International Business & Economic Research Journal                                                              Volume 1, Number 7 
 92 
 
1. Berle, Jr., A. and G. Means, 1932, The modern corporation and private property, MacMillan Company, 
New York. 
2. Cheffins, B., 1999, Current trends in corporate governance: going from London to Milan via Toronto Duke, 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 10:5, 5-42. 
3. DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo, 1985, Managerial ownership of voting rights, Journal of Financial 
Economics 14, 33-69. 
4. Demsetz, H., 1983, The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm, Journal of Law and Economics 
26, 375-393. 
5. Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn, 1985, The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences, Journal 
of Political Economy 93, 1155-1177. 
6. Denis, D. and D. Denis, 1994, Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 1, 91-118. 
7. Fama, E. and M. Jensen, 1983, Agency problems and residual claims, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 
327-349. 
8. Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 2000, Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a 
survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy Review, forthcoming. 
9. Holderness, C. G. and D. Sheehan, 1988,The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations -- 
an exploratory analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317-346.  
10. Jensen, M., 1993, The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems, Journal 
of Finance 48, 831-880. 
11. Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership 
structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
12. Johnson, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 2000, Tunneling. Working Paper. 
13. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political 
Economy 106, 1115-1155. 
14. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer, 1998, Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of 
Finance 54, 471-517. 
15. McConaughy, D., M. Walker, G. Henderson, and C. Mishra, 1998, Founding family controlled firms: 
efficiency and value, Review of Financial Economics 7, 1-19. 
16. McConaughy, D., and G. Phillips, 1999, Founders versus descendants: the profitability, efficiency, growth 
characteristics and financing in large public founding-family-controlled firms, Family Business Review 
12(2), 123-131. 
17. McConnell, J., and H. Servaes, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, 
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612. 
18. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical 
analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315. 
19. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783. 
20. Yermack, D., 1996, Higher valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial 
Economics 40, 185-212. 
 
 
